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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALTA FAYE WALKER LAKE and 





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14291 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiffs-appellants 
against defendant-respondent seeking recovery of money damages 
pursuant to a written contract. 
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT 
The matter was tried before the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson, without a jury, who found for the defendant-respondent 
on the basis that the contract was clear and unambiguous and 
that defendant-respondent had complied with all the conditions 
and terms thereof, and that plaintiffs-appellants were not 
entitled to recover against defendant-respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants appeal and seek reversal of the trial 
court's decision upon the theory that the trial court erred in 
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the interpretation and construction of the contract and seeks 
to have this court decide the factual question of the construc-
tion of the contracts. 
Respondent seeks to sustain the trial court's determina-
tion that plaintiffs are not entitled to any recovery in that 
the contracts are clear and unambiguous and that defendant 
complied with all the terms and conditions of the contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellants have attempted in their Statement of Facts 
to emphasize and state the evidence admitted before the trial 
court in favor of their arguments rather than in accordance 
with the facts found by the trial court. 
Thus, defendant-respondent sets forth below those facts 
which fairly state the case: 
Plaintiffs and defendant entered into two written con-
tracts, Exhibits 1-P and 2-P, for the purchase of an one-ninth 
(1/9) interest per contract, of the undivided interest of certain 
real estate located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Each of the plaintiffs has succeeded to their own 
undivided one-ninth (1/9) interest as an heir,legatee or devisee 
of the various Walker Estates according to the files of the 
Probate Division of the Third District Court. (Exhibit 7-D) 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant did purchase at a private court confirmed 
sale the four-ninths (4/9) undivided interest of the Minnetta 
Walker and 11 a Minetta Walker Estates. (Tr. pp. 15 and 16; 
Exhibit 3-P) 
These private sales brought to the various Walker 
Estates the sum of $88,572.08 for the four-ninths (4/9) interest 
(the Minnetta and Ila Minnetta Walker interests) and the sum 
of $10,000.00 for the one-ninth (1/9) R. E. Walker interest. 
The record clearly indicates that the aforementioned 
interests were sold in private and court confirmed sales after 
negotiations between the purchaser and the administrators of 
the various Walker Estates. (Tr. pp. 15 and 16; Exhibits 7-D, 
3-P and 4-P) 
It is conceded by appellants in their brief that the 
purchase of the one-ninth (1/9) R. E. Walker interest was a 
negotiated private sale which brought to the seller the sum 
of $10,000.00, the same sum of money paid to the plaintiffs 
for each of their own one-ninth interest. (Page 3 Appellants' 
brief; Exhibit 3-P -Exhibit A; Tr. p. 15) 
Exhibit 4-P shows that the four-ninths (4/9) interest 
was sold pursuant to a negotiated private sale, court confirmed, 
in that a previously entered court order authorizing the 
disposition of the property was vacated. (Exhibit 4-P; paragraph 
5) The new court order (Exhibit 4-P) authorized the sale of the 
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property for a price different than previously, according 
to the terms and conditions arrived at after negotiations 
between the purchaser and the administrator of the estate. 
The record does not reflect anywhere that the disposi-
tion of the property was pursuant to competitive bidding and 
plaintiffs offered no evidence to that effect. 
ARGUMENT 
1 4 THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE ON THE 
RECORD. 
Appellants base their appeal on the theory that the 
trial court erred in the reading and construction of Exhibit 
1-P and 2-P, the contracts subject matter of the litigation 
and thi s appeal. 
The trial court in reviewing all the evidence before it, 
to-wit, the contracts, Exhibits 1-P and 2-P and taking judicial 
notice of the material contained in the files of the probate 
proceeding affecting the real property, Exhibit 7-D, subject 
matter of the contracts, found that there was no competitive 
bidding as required by the contracts and that the defendant-
respondent fully complied with its obligations thereunder, 
(a) The contracts were found by the trial 
court to be "clear and unambiguous." 
The contracts, Exhibits 1-P and 2-P contained a 
condition precedent, to-wit, the condition relating to competitive 
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bidding, which if fulfilled then and in that event respondent 
would be liable for additional payments. 
The language of said condition precedent in both contracts 
is as fol1ows: 
11
. . . but if the bids for similar interests 
in various walker [sic] estates are improved 
by competitive bidding, then we agree . . ." 
(Exhibit 2-P) 
". . . it is possible that the court con-
firmation of sale, the price will be improved 
by competitive bidding. I agree that if an 
amount in excess . . ." (Exhibit 1-P) 
In discussing conditions precedent to a contract the 
general rule of law is stated thusly in 17 Am Jur. 2d, Section 
320, Contracts. 
A condition in a contract may be express or 
implied and no particular form of words is 
necessary in order to create an express con-
dition, although words and phrases such as "if" 
or "provided that", qualifying a promise, are 
commonly used to indicate that the duty of the 
promisor has expressly been made conditional . 
Citations omitted. 17 Am.Jur. 2d @ p. 749 
In the instant case the parties had agreed that the 
happening of a particular event, to-wit, competitive bidding 
and subsequent court confirmed approval of said competitive 
bidding would trigger the obligation and performance of the 
respondent to pay additional consideration to appellants. 
But the record clearly shows that no such event took 
place. The property was sold by means of a private sale, court 
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confirmed as required by the statute, and not by competitive 
bidding. The record shows disposition of the property , in t 
in regards to the one-ninth (1/9) interest of Robert Elgin 
Walker, appellants' witness testified as follows: 
Q And you are talking about a one-ninth interest of 
the R. E. Walker estate? 
A Yes. 
Q And that sold for $10,000.00? 
A I believe it was. 
Q Was that a private sale, Sir? 
A Yes, sir. (Tr. p. 15, lines 14 to 20) 
And in regards to the other interest, four-ninths (4/9) the 
testimony of the person responsible for the administration of 
the various Walker Estates is as follows: 
Q Did you also know of the sale of the four-ninths as 
well as of the one-ninth? 
A Yes. 
Q When that sold was that a private sale as well? 
A Yes. 
Q And it was later confirmed by the Court, is that 
correct? 
A Yes, that is corret. (Emphasis supplied) (Tr. p. 1 
line 27 to p. 16 line 4) 
The above testimony is also buttressed by the pleadings and 
documents contained in probate files of each of the estates 
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containing said property, Exhibit 7-D, which files were 
admitted in evidence before the trial court. 
It is abundantly clear from the record that there is 
ample credible evidence to support the trial court's findings 
of fact that respondent's purchase of the property was by and 
through the means of a court confirmed private sale. 
Furthermore, the record is abundantly clear supporting 
the trial court's finding that the respondent has fully 
complied with the agreements entered with appellants. 
It is elementary that the appellate court will not 
disturb the findings and rulings of the trial court where the 
record disclosed that there are ample, believable, competent 
and admissible evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
and rulings. See Gibbons and Reed Company v. Ogden City, et al. 
No. 14030, Dec. 26, 1975 (Utah), Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 
389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961 ) . 
The evidence in the instant case sustains the findings 
of the lower court and it is respectfully urged that this court 
honor the court's findings herein. 
(b) Construction of the contracts. 
Appellants in their brief suggest that the contracts, 
Exhibits 1-P and 2-P, should be so read and construed as to 
favor their position because according to appellants' inter-
pretation of the record respondent was the author of the 
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agreements. 
While there is no question that the actual ministerial 
act of putting them in black and white typewritten form was that 
of respondent, the record also shows clearly and unequivocally 
that the contracts were the subject matter of intense negotia-
tions by and between the respondent and Mr. Lake on behalf of his 
mother and himself. The only evidence relating to the prepara-
tion of the contracts is contained in the following excerpt from 
the transcri pt: 
Q Was the instrument prepared by you and your attorney? 
A The answer to that is yes, but in order not to be 
misleading I think it is necessary to add that it was 
prepared with the concurrence of Mr. Lake. So I 
don't know if you are getting at who typed it, but 
: K this is a reflection of the agreement we reached. 
Q In your opinion you or your attorney were the author 
of the instrument, is that correct? 
A Well, you are asking a technical question. Yes, we 
typed it, but I would feel it was necessary to add, 
if we are getting at the spirit of truth, as well as 
the technical truth, this is an agreement I reached 
with Mr. Lake, and wrote it, yes. 
Q You or your attorney did write the agreement? 
A Yes. 
Q I will show you what has been marked "Exhibit 2-P," 
and is your signature at the bottom of that instrument? 
A Yes, and it was modified in certain respects as 
specifically suggested by Mr. Lake in terms of both 
the numbers and the document, but again, yes, it is 
true me and my attorney did write it. (Tr. p. 6, lines 
2 to 25) 
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The principle of law asserted by respondent, whereby 
in case of ambiguity a contract will be construed against 
the party who prepared it, has been applied by and large by 
courts in cases where the executed contracts are printed forms 
prepared by and regularly used by one of the parties. In the 
instant case the contracts are an expression of the intent of 
the parties the intent of which is clear and unambiguous. 
Assuming arguendo that there might be some ambiguity in the 
contracts it was the burden of the respondent to show that the 
terms and conditions recited therein were other than their 
normal meaning. Sunseri v. Garcia & M. Co., 298 Pa. 249, 148 A. 
81. The record contains no such evidence. 
But even if the foregoing principle is appropriate in 
the instant case, it would be applicable only to ambiguous 
contracts, and it will not be applied in defiance of the 
terms of the contract or to overturn the intention of the 
parties when it is clearly manifest from the entire contract. 
The trial court found the contracts to be "clear and 
unambiguous", and thus, applying the ordinary rules of 
construction thereon arrived at the appropriate findings. 
In attempting to show the intent of the parties, 
appellants in their breif resort to the argument that respon-
dent purposefully thwarted attempts to competitively bid on the 
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sale of the property. Such an argument has no foundation upon 
any facts explicit or implicit on the record before this court 
and none is cited by appellants. It is merely used by 
appellants to cloud the issue before this court, and it is 
a product of appellants' imagination requiring no further 
response by respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully urged upon this court that the 
findings of fact and decision of the trial court be sustained 
i n their enti rety. 
When the entire record is surveyed the trial court 
was within its prerogative to believe the evidence presented 
evidencing the intent of the parties, and the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion, was not arbitrary or capricious 
and that the trial court's ruling was based on adequately credi-
ble evidence sustaining the same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1fMJ}U^f 
NICK J . crfLESSIDES 
Attorney *for Respondent 
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